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By Where you have added the piece about A. B. Smith at the Will you please delete my phrase. " I think the Also delete the London Gazette Supplement Dated the 24th. and replace with the following: "On March 10, 1917, the refrigerated meat ship Otaki, commanded by Captain Archibald Bisset Smith, sailing 350 miles east of the Azores, was sunk by the German commerce raider Moewe, but not before the Otaki's 4.7 inch gun had inflicted so much damage on the Moewe that, although able to reach Kiel, she never returned to sea. The Otaki lost six crewmen, including Captain Bisset Smith, who went down with his ship. Smith was a civilian and therefore not strictly entitled to receive the VC, so he was posthumously gazetted a lieutenant in the Royal Naval Reserve. The London Gazette of May 24th. 1919, details the award. Citation of the award of the Victoria Cross posthumously to Lieutenant A.B. Smith RNR. The Supplement of the London Gazette. 24th. of May 1919. Lieutenant Archibald Bisset Smith, R N R. For most conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty when in command of the S S " Otaki," on the 10th March, 1917. At about 2 30 p m on 10th March, 1917 the S S Otaki whose armament consisted of one 4. 7 in gun for defensive purposes, sighted the disguised German raider Moewe which was armed with four 5.9 inch, one 4.1 inch and two 22 pdr guns, and two torpedo tubes. The Moewe kept the Otaki under observation for some time and finally called upon her to stop. This Lieutenant Smith refused to do, and a duel ensued at ranges of 1900, 2000 yards, and lasted for about 20 minutes. During this action, the Otaki scored several hits on the Moewe causing considerable damage, and starting a fire, which lasted for three days. She sustained several casualties and received much damage her self, and was heavily on fire, Lieutenant Smith, therefore, gave orders for the boats to be lowered to allow the crew to be rescued. He remained on the ship himself and went down with her when she sank with the British colours still flying, after what was described in an enemy account as " a duel as gallant as naval history can relate "
http://www.ahoy.tk-jk.net/macslog/TheSinkingofBritishBattle.html Could you please add this addition at the end? I found it Thanks, Mac.
Appendix 1 Extract from Log of U-47, 15th Sept. - 21st Oct. 1939. Time Position, Wind, etc. Incidents Exact positions cannot be given as under special orders all secret documents were destroyed before carrying out of order 9/10/39 South of Dogger Bank. Wind SSE 4-5. Overcast, very dark night. Lying submerged. After dark, surfaced and proceeded on our way. Met rather a lot of fishing vessels. 10/10/39 North of Dogger Bank. Wind SSE 7. Overcast. During day lay submerged; at night continued on course. 11/10/39 Devil's Hole. Wind ESE 7-8, Overcast During day lay submerged off Orkneys. Surfaced in the evening and came in to the coast in order to fix exact position of ship. From 2200 to 2230 the English are kind enough to switch on all the coastal lights so that I can obtain the most exact fix. The ship's position is correct to within 1.8 nautical miles, despite the fact that since leaving Channel 1 there was no possibility of obtaining an accurate fix, so that I had to steer by dead reckonings and soundings. 13/10/39 E. of Orkney Islands. Wind NNE 3-4, light clouds, very clear night, Northern Lights on entire horizon. At 0437 lying submerged in 90 meters of water. Rest period for crew. At 1600 general stand-to. After breakfast at 1700, preparations for attack on Scapa Flow. Two torpedoes are placed in rapid loading position before tubes 1 and 2. Explosives brought out in case of necessity of scuttling. Crew's morale splendid. Surfaced at 1915. After warm supper for entire crew, set course for Holm Sound. Everything goes according to plan until 2307, when it is necessary to submerge on sighting a merchant ship just before Rose Ness. I cannot make out the ship in either of the periscopes, in spite of the very clear night and the bright lights. At 2331, surfaced again and entered Holm Sound. Following tide. On nearer approach, the sunken blockship in Skerry Sound is clearly visible, so that at first I believe myself to be already in Kirk Sound, and prepare for work. But the navigator, by means of dead reckoning, states that the preparations are premature, while I at the same time realize the mistake, for there is only one sunken ship in the straits. By altering course hard to starboard, the imminent danger is averted. A few minutes later, Kirk Sound is clearly visible. 13/10/39 contd. It is a very eerie sight. On land everything is dark, high in the sky are the flickering Northern Lights, so that the bay, surrounded by English mountains, is directly lit up from above. The blockships lie in the sound, ghostly as the wings of a theatre. I am now repaid for having learnt the chart beforehand, for the penetration proceeds with unbelievable speed. In the meantime I had decided to pass the blockships on the Northern side. On a course of 270 I pass the two-masted schooner, which is lying on a bearing of 315 in front of the real boom, with 15 meters to spare. In the next minute the boat is turned by the current to starboard. At the same time I recognize the cable of the northern blockship at an angle of 45 degrees ahead. Port engine stopped, starboard engine slow ahead, and rudder hard to port, the boat slowly touches bottom. The stern still touches the cable, the boat becomes free, it is pulled round to port, and brought on to course again with difficult rapid maneuvering, but; we are in Scapa Flow. 0027 It is disgustingly light. The whole bay is lit up. To the south of Cava there is nothing. I go farther in. To port, I recognize the Hoxa Sound coastguard, to which in the next few minutes the boat must present itself as a target. In that event all would be lost; at present South of Cava there is no shipping; so before staking everything on success, all possible precautions must be taken. 0055 Therefore, turn to port is made. We proceed north by the coast. Two battleships are lying there at anchor, and further inshore, destroyers. Cruisers not visible, therefore attack on the big fellows. Distance apart, 3000 meters. 0116 (time queried in pencil, 0058 suggested) Estimated depth, 7.5 meters. Impact firing. One torpedo fixed on the northern ship, two on the southern. After a good 3 1/2 minutes, a torpedo detonates on the northern ship; of the other two nothing is to be seen. 0121 (queried to 0102) (suggested time 0123, in pencil) About! Torpedo fired from stern; in the bow two tubes are loaded; three torpedoes from the bow. After three tense minutes comes the detonation on the nearer ship. There is a loud explosion, roar, and rumbling. Then come columns of water, followed by columns of fire, and splinters fly through the air. The harbor springs to life. Destroyers are lit up, signaling starts on every side, and on land 200 meters away from me cars roar along the roads. A battleship has been sunk, a second damaged, and the other three torpedoes have gone to blazes. All the tubes are empty. I decide to withdraw, because: (1) With my periscopes I cannot conduct night attacks while submerged. (See experience on entering.) (2) On a bright night I cannot maneuver unobserved in a calm sea. (3) I must assume that I was observed by the driver of a car which stopped opposite us, turned around, and drove off towards Scapa at top speed. (4) Nor can I go further north, for there, well hidden from my sight, lie the destroyers which were previously dimly distinguishable. 0128 At high speed both engines we withdraw. Everything is simple until we reach Skildaenoy Point. Then we have more trouble. It is now low tide, the current is against us. Engines at slow and dead slow, I attempt to get away. I must leave by the south through the narrows, because of the depth of the water. Things are again difficult. Course, 058, slow - 10 knots. I make no progress. At high speed I pass the southern blockship with nothing to spare. The helmsman does magnificently. High speed ahead both, finally 3/4 speed and full ahead all out. Free of the blockships - ahead a mole! Hard over and again about, and at 0215 we are once more outside. A pity that only one was destroyed. The torpedo misses I explain due to faults of course, speed, and drift. In tube 4, a misfire. The crew behaved splendidly throughout the operation. On the morning of 13/10, the lubricating oil was found to have 7-8% water in it. All hands worked feverishly to change the oil, i.e. to get rid of the water and 0215 Set SE course for base. I still have 5 torpedoes for possible attacks on merchantmen. 0630 57° 58' N, 01° 03' W Lay submerged. The glow from Scapa is still visible for a long time. Apparently they are still 1935 ENE 3-4, light clouds, occasional rain, visibility bad towards land, otherwise good dropping depth charges. Off again, course 180°. This course was chosen in the hope that we might perhaps catch a ship inshore, and to avoid U-20. 15/10/39 0600 56° 20' N, 0° 40' W Submerged and lay at 72 meters. From 1000 onwards, depth charges were dropped from time to time in the distance. 32 depth charges were definitely counted. So I lie low, submerged, until dusk. 1823 Wind NE 5, sea 4, swell from E, cloudy, visibility good. Surfaced. On surfacing, Norwegian steamer "METEOR" lies ahead. W/T traffic from the steamer is reported in error from the W/T office; I therefore fire a salvo far ahead of the steamer which is already stopped. The steamer is destined for Newcastle on Tyne, with 238 passengers. Steamer immediately allowed to proceed. It is reported later by the W/T office that the steamer did not make any signals. 16/10/39 0702 54° 57' N, 2° 58' E, Wind NNW 2-3, visibility good. General course 180°. Submerged on the Dogger Bank. 3 drifting mines sighted, 54° 58' N, 2° 56' E. No measures taken, owing to the proximity of fishing vessels. Proceeded submerged throughout the day. 1856 54° 51' N, 3° 21' E, Wind NW 2, light clouds, visibility good. Surfaced. Course 128°. Steered course of 128° into Channel 1. 17/10/39 0404 Channel 1 passed. From 0404 to 0447 chased fishing vessel escort ship no. 808; gave recognition signal eight times - no reply received. This fool did not react until V/S was used at a distance of 500-600 meters. With such guardships, an incident such as my operation could occur in our waters also. 1100 Entered port - Wilhelmshaven III. 1144 Tied up. 1530 Crew flown to Kiel and Berlin 20/10/39 1600 Crew returned. Sailed for Kiel. 2330 Met an armed fishing trawler at anchor with riding lights in the stretch between Elbe I and Elbe II. I pass him with darkened ship at a distance of 40 meters. Apparently he sees nothing, because no recognition signal is made. 21/10/39 0120 Tied up at Brunsbüttel Lock. 1300 Tied up at Holtenau Lock. Operation completed.
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