TK's staging site |
By tk *OCRM issues dredging stop order -Fendig wants a second, non-fishing pier (St Simons) *Opponents to debate wider manatee zones *New plan would add pier to city’s redevelopment list *Walton County to add more warning flags to beaches
Leyte Gulf P 12. explosion, and an amazing fire ball engulfed the wreck, which quickly sank. It was my first experience of a Kamikaze attack and its deadly result. Task Unit 77.4.3 Taffy Three.
The Battle of Suriago Strait. Jesse Oldendorf had been ordered by Kinkaid to put his force plus 39 PT Boats in place, to prevent the Japanese ships from moving through Suriago Strait whence they could attack the landings on the beaches at Leyte. These PT Boats were spread out covering a large area, 15 in the north, 15 in the centre and the remaining 9 cruising south of the Strait. The destroyers were closest to the Strait exit, with the 6 old Battleships, West Virginia, Tennessee, California, Pennsylvania, Mississippi, and Maryland, behind the Destroyer screen, but able to fire over the top of them. On the right flank were the Cruisers, HMAS Shropshire, Phoenix, and Boise with Rear Admiral Berkley commanding, on the left flank, the cruiser Louisville with the flag of Rear Admiral Oldendorf, plus the cruisers, Minneapolis, Portland, Denver, and Columbia. In addition, to the east of Leyte were a number of Destroyer Squadrons on patrol, Desron 54 with 5 DD's, Desron 24 with 6 DD's, including HMAS Arunta, Des Div Xray with 5 DD's, Desron 56, 9 DD's, plus a final 3 Destroyers. It was anticipated that the outlying PT Boats would be the first units to sight the approaching Japanese force, and would raise the alarm. Nishimura's Southern Force had been sighted by carrier aircraft and attacked, some minor damage had been inflicted on the Battleship Fuso, and an escorting Destroyer, but not sufficient to prevent them from maintaining their place in the line. The Japanese line of command was not clear cut, although overall command was vested in Admiral S. Toyodo based ashore, Nashimura of the Southern Force C reported to Vice Admiral Kurita of Southern Command, and Shima commanding the 2nd. Strike force was responsible to Vice Admiral of the South West Command of the 5th. Fleet. He was in fact senior to Nashimura, who had the Battleships in his charge, whilst Shima had to be content with the Cruiser force. There appeared to be no coordination between the two ship groups as they proceeded toward Surigao Strait. The Japanese plan had Nishimura arriving off the invasion beaches at 0500 ( 5 AM ) on the 25th. of October, to destroy MacArthur's landings, and Shuma was scheduled to arrive an hour later with his Cruisers to finish the job. The two groups had not worked together before, and already Shuma was two hours behind Nashimura's force, it did not look good for them. At about 2215 ( 10.15 PM ) PT Boats 130, 131, and 152 loosed their torpedoes at the Japanese fleet, without any tangible result. PT 152 was hit by a shell from a Japanese Destroyer, putting her radio out of action, and delaying the relay of an enemy report to Oldendorf. The US Battle fleet stood off Suriago Strait waiting to execute their commanding Admiral's plan, to put into effect of crossing the "T" used by Lord Nelson to defeat the enemy ships
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